HIMALAYA, the Journal of the
Association for Nepal and
Himalayan Studies
Volume 31

Number 1

Article 10

8-1-2012

Land, Livelihood and Rana Tharu Identity Transformations In FarWestern Nepal
Lai Ming Lam
The University of Adelaide, your_laiming@yahoo.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya

Recommended Citation
Lam, Lai Ming. 2012. Land, Livelihood and Rana Tharu Identity Transformations In Far-Western Nepal.
HIMALAYA 31(1).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol31/iss1/10

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by the DigitalCommons@Macalester College at
DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association
for Nepal and Himalayan Studies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
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Land, Livelihood And Rana Tharu Identity
Transformations in Far-Western Nepal
This paper focuses on the identity of the Tharu, who live throughout the Tarai region. There have been
social movements among Tharus that aim to promote their ethnic identity by opposing the Hindu
identity and caste system. However, my ethnographic study of the Rana Tharu, a sub-group of Tharu
in far-western Nepal, shows that the everyday practice of ethnic identity is fluid and dynamic, and
cannot be understood in terms of a single ideology. While ideologies concerning “Sanskritization” and
“Indigenousness” have dominated the discussion of social reforms and ethnic movements in Nepal,
I find that a hybrid approach is more relevant to the Rana Tharu situation. The Rana Tharu adopted
social movement strategies that differed from those of other Tharu groups. Ranas actively used different
identities and cultural practices to achieve an equal social footing with the dominant hill settlers
(Pahaaris). They imitated hill cultures on the one hand but also clung to some of their traditional
customs and were proud of “being Rana.” The motivation behind this was not merely to gain more
political power but also to obtain a better livelihood and self-identity. This paper adopts a bottom-up
perspective by viewing ethnicity at the local level. The Rana case illustrates that the nature of ethnicity
was situational, topical and dynamic. Ranas practiced different forms of identity when reacting to social
change, history and livelihood. Ranas were engaged in a kind of complex balancing and interweaving of
identity strategies that combine aspects of the discourses of both Sanskritization and Indigenousness.
This identity and cultural management was the major force in the transformation of Rana Tharu society.

INTRODUCTION
The Tharu people are one of the largest ethnic
minorities in Nepal and they make up 6.6 percent
of the total population. They live throughout the
southern belt of Nepal called the Tarai from the east
through to the west and the adjacent valleys between
the Churia Range and the Mahabharat called the
Inner Tarai. Most of the Tharu people are known
in terms of the territory that they occupy or from
where they have migrated (Guneratne 2002).1 The
Tarai had previously suffered from endemic malaria,
which made extensive cultivation almost impossible.
Therefore, until the 1950s, it was mainly covered by
forest with a sparse population consisting mainly of
Tharus, who were believed to have strong resistance
to malaria. However, recent history shows that
the Tarai experienced remarkable socio-economic
change, including shifts in demography and rising
conflicts over the control of land. Following the
success of the malaria eradication program in the
Tarai region during the 1950s, the area became
not only favorable to Tharus but all other people,
particularly the hill population. Many Tharus
1. For example, Kochila Tharu in eastern Tarai; Chitwaniya
and Deshaurya Tharu in central Tarai; Dangaura Tharu in western
Tarai and Rana Tharu in far western Tarai.

lost their land to hill migrants and their customs
were threatened. Significant scholarly work has
documented the ways in which Tharus reacted to
these social changes (Guneratne 2002; Krauskopff
2002; Odegaard 1997).
According to the literature, mainstream Tharu
social reforms can be divided into two periods:
before the 1990s and after the 1990s. The Tharu
reform processes can be summarized in terms of
two important ideologies, “Sanskritization” and
“Indigenousness”, which have long influenced the
history of Nepalese ethnic movements and indeed
analyses of them. Despite their differences, they
have been closely linked to issues of livelihood
and economic matters. In particular, changes in
landownership have long played a key role in
shaping relations between high-castes and ethnic
groups (Caplan 1970; Jones 1967) and inter-ethnic
group relations (Campbell 1997; Odegaard 1997).
The concept of Sanskritization was first developed
by Srinivas (1962) and widely used in describing the
social mobility of Hindu caste groups. According to
Jones (1967:63), Sanskritization describes “a process
by which a lower caste or non-Hindu group adopts
the ideology or parts of ideology of Hinduism in an
attempt to raise its economic, political, and social
status in the caste hierarchy of a given area.” He
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points out that the acceptance of caste is the first step in
Sanskritization, and the adoption of the language, dress and
religious practices of the high Hindu castes is its core process.
Levine (1987) further argues that economic and political
factors are the underlying motivation for Sanskritization by
ethnic groups.
However, Sanskritization is not the only strategy that
ethnic groups use to respond to the domination of high
Hindu caste groups. Sanskritization can be understood
as a product of the early stage of nation-building (PfaffCzarnecka 1997; Sharma 1997), while Indigenousness
seems to be a social product that responds to global social
movements and in particular post-1990s Nepal. According to
Wilmer and Martin’s (2006) analysis, the indigenous rights
movement that emerged in the 1990s greatly influenced
minorities, resource-poor groups and local activists in every
corner of the world; Nepal was no exception. Meanwhile,
the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe also inspired
the first nationwide social movement, the Jan Andolan
(People’s Movement), which arose in Nepal in 1990, and
that campaign ended the monarchical Panchayat system.
Instead of being known as the “Hindu kingdom,” the 1990
Constitution declared Nepal a multi-ethnic and multilingual state (Gurung 1997).2 This new polity has provided
an opportunity for many socially deprived ethnic groups
to “discover pride in their ethnic identity” and become
“conscious that they can take advantage of the democratic
situation and bargain for a good share in the political and
economic pie” (Sharma 1997: 482). Many ethnic groups
realized the advantages of claiming indigenous status and
preserving their traditional customs. In the new ethnic
social movement, most ethnic activists use anti-Hindu
and anti-caste campaign slogans. Furthermore these
social campaigns emphasize the promotion of indigenous
language, religious practices and dress.
Ideologies that claim to have originated out of
Sanskritization or Indigenousness have deeply influenced
Tharu social movements. The earliest Tharu social movement
emerged in 1949 when the first Tharu organization—the
Tharu Welfare Society (TWS)—was formed by the elites
of the eastern Tharus (Guneratne 2002; Krauskopff 2002;
Odegaard 1997). Its establishment was mainly a response to
increased contacts with the hill people and their cultures.
The early strategy of TWS was much like Sanskritization
because the campaign specifically focused on emulating high
Hindu caste behavior. Through the promotion of abstinence
from alcohol, and efforts to have women wear blouses and
saris instead of traditional dress, the TWS sought to raise the
social status of Tharus. Many Tharu groups also claimed they
were descendents of high Hindu castes. For example, Tharus
from Chitwan believed that they had blood relations with

2. In 28 May 2008, the elected Assembly voted to abolish the
monarchy and declared that Nepal has become a democratic republic.
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Rajputs, and Dangauras traced their origin to the Thakurs3
in Ayodhya and to King Ram Chandra.4 Furthermore, in
an attempt to improve people’s economic status, the TWS
advocated reducing life-cycle ceremony expenditures. The
TWS, however, was perceived to be an elite organization
and it failed to gain complete support from the different
Tharu groups throughout the Tarai, particularly those from
the western Tarai like Dangauras and Ranas. They had not
even heard of the TWS (Odegaard 1997). The strategies also
contradicted local Tharu cultural practices.5 As a result, the
campaign did not have any significant impact.
Another Tharu organization, the precursor to Backward
Society Education (BASE), was appeared in 1985. Its
formation was a reaction to the rising conflict over land
resources, which most Tharu communities had endured
for nearly half a century. The founder of that organization
was a Tharu named Dilli Bahadur Chaudhary from Dang
district. His family had lost substantial land to Pahaaris and
was seriously in debt. Dilli thought illiteracy was one of
the most important reasons for the subordinate position of
Tharus so the promotion of education was his top priority.6
BASE focused on the loss of their land as the most critical
issue Tharus faced, and as a result it enjoyed widespread
support from western Tharus. This was the first grass roots
Tharu social movement. Dilli also successfully drew on the
ideology of the global indigenous rights movement to assert
the claim of Tharus as indigenous people.
On the other hand, TWS also realized that its old
strategy did not work. Influenced by the new democratic
reality created by the 1990 people’s movement and the global
indigenous movement, TWS developed new social reform
strategies. According to Odegaard (1997), in order to link
themselves more effectively to the international indigenous
movement and obtain aid from foreign donor agencies, the
leaders of TWS sought to portray the Tharu as indigenous
people. The brotherhood of all Tharus and their indigenous
status was therefore highlighted in the new ideology. The
TWS rejected caste ideology and became affiliated with the
anti-Hindu, anti-Brahmin organization Janajati Mahasangh
(The Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities). In 1993,
a well known Tharu leader of the TWS, Ramanand Prasad
Singh, even wrote a book, The Real Story of the Tharu, which
claimed that Tharus were descendents of the Buddha. It was
expected that this claim would not be accepted by all Tharu
3. Both Ranas and Dangauros claim that the term “Tharu” is a
misnomer for “Thakur”. Thakur refers to the descendants of kings,
particularly Rajput descendants (Odegaard 1997).
4. The term “Rajput” refers to plain caste (lit. “Kings’ sons”) (Gellner
et al. 1997: 547). The claim of being descendants from Rajput is a common
strategy for many low castes and ethnic groups wanting a higher caste
position (Odegaard 1997).
5. Most Tharu groups used to consume much alcohol and a large
variety of meats. The imposed non-alcoholism and vegetarian policies were
seldom found at the local level.
6. For the impacts of BASE on Tharu communities, see Odegaard
(1997; 1999).

groups but its importance lay in raising consciousness of
Tharu identity. Several national Tharu conferences were held
during the 1990s and all participants from different Tarai
areas were aware of the importance of cultural preservation.
Speaking the Tharu language, wearing Tharu clothes, and
practicing Tharu rituals were symbols of being Tharus. The
campaign was summed up as a “pan-Tharu movement” by
Odegaard (1997).
One of the most important factors in the consolidation
of a Tharu idenitity is land. McDonaugh (1989) and
Guneratne (2002) analyzed the appearance of contemporary
Tharu movements as being associated with the problem of
unequal land distribution. Guneratne (2002: 68) concludes
that “Tharu ethnic identity is formed not on the basis of
shared cultural features but in terms of particular structural
relationship to the State.” He points out that “[w]here
Tharus are concerned, [the mobilizing factor] is access to
and control of land” (2002: 18). His comment has clearly
highlighted the close relationships between ethnicity, social
movement and livelihood.
In this paper, using my ethnographic study of a subTharu group — the Rana Tharus in far-western Nepal — I
argue that complex interactions between land, livelihood
and local histories have played a key role in the identity
formation of contemporary Rana society. My ethnographic
data has supported that although they shared the problems
faced by Tharus throughout the Tarai, the Ranas did not
join the Pan-Tharu movement but continued to claim a
high caste status and royal pedigree and preserved their
unique culture, which distanced them from other Tharus.
Why did Ranas react to social changes differently than
other Tharu communities? Most Ranas even refused to be
labeled “Tharus”. This paper intends to explore the identity
formation of Ranas through a closer examination of the
relationships between ethnicity, local histories, livelihoods
and social changes and their influence on Rana identity
strategies. The paper echoes the critique of other scholars that
the problems consist of dichotomous analytical perspectives
in understanding social relations in South Asian literature
(Dahal 1979; Fisher 2001; Gellner 1991; Gellner et al.
1997; Jaffrelot 2003; Levine 1987). Dahal (1979) critiques
that no cultural group in Nepal can be neatly defined as a
tribe and that adopting the Hindu-tribal perspective is only
imagined by scholars and not the people they are studying.
Levine’s study (1987) of the ethnic identity of three ethnic
groups in Humla district has shown that the classical social
categories were not the key determinant of ethnic relations.
More realistically, economic and political motivations could
shape ethnic relations. I feel that neither Sanskritization
nor indigenousness can explain the ethnic character of a
social group; other approaches are often completely ignored.
The Rana example indicates that self-identity and ethnic
relations with others can take on many forms. In addition,
there is a tendency for scholars to rely too much on ethnicity
that is focused at the national level and on the elite classes.

If we adopt a bottom-up perspective by viewing ethnicity
at the local level, we will find that the nature of ethnicity
is not a fixed historical and cultural product but it can be
interpreted in different ways, modified and transformed
(Eriksen 1993:16). In this process, livelihood issues and
local histories have significantly influenced the formation
and transformation of ethnic identity.
This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part,
I provide a detailed history of the Ranas. History played a
critical role in shaping the identity of Ranas as shown in the
latter stages of this paper. In the second part, I will discuss
the impacts of social changes on Rana society. In particular
I will look at how Ranas changed from a majority to a
minority group, from big landlords to small landholders or
even nearly landless people because of the land registration
system, hill migration and the creation of the Shuklaphanta
Wildlife Reserve. These socio-economic changes mobilized
the ethnic consciousness of Ranas. In the last part, using the
ethnographic data, I will analyze how livelihood realities
interact with local histories and the contemporary ethnic
movement, resulting in the complex ways Ranas feel about
themselves and other social groups.7

THE HISTORY OF THE RANA IN FAR-WESTERN
NEPAL
My fieldwork was carried out in villages neighboring
Shuklaphanta Wildlife Reserve located in the westernmost
part of Nepal, Kanchanpur district, 750 kilometers from
the capital city, Kathmandu. Kanchanpur is a part of the
western Tarai, which Nepal conceded to the British after
the Anglo-Nepal war (1814-1816). However, the British
Government returned it to Nepal in 1860, as a reward for
assisting the British to quell the Indian Mutiny of 1857. This
area was known as Naya Muluk and consists of the districts
of Banke, Bardia, Kailali and Kanchanpur (Guneratne 2002).
Kanchanpur had previously suffered from an extensive
malaria epidemic, which made extension of the cultivated
area almost impossible. Therefore, until 1963, it was mainly
covered by forest with a sparse population and scattered
settlements. The majority of the population consisted of
the indigenous Tharu people who were believed to have
strong resistance to malaria. Tharus were divided into two
subgroups—Rana and Dangaura—that were significantly
different in language and customs (see Odegaard 1997).
The paper mainly focuses on Rauteli Bichawa Village which
was the first human settlement in Kanchanpur. The Ranas
originally settled in this particular forest frontier (KDDC
2002).

Royal Ethnic Label
Despite the fact that written histories regarding the
7. Note: In order to protect interviewees’ privacy, some names
published in this paper are pseudonyms. Also, because the Rana language
is an unwritten one, I rendered what was said into Devanagari and then
transliterated it into English.
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origin of Ranas in Kanchanpur are very few, their past has
been recorded via local oral traditions. Rauteli Bichawa
Ranas claimed that they were descendants from the Rajputs
(Thakuri) of Chittogarh in Rajasthan. When the Muslims
invaded, the king and his twelve retainers fled Chittogarh
and some settled in BaraRana (meaning twelve Ranas,
possibly modern Garwal), while others fled until they came
to Sukala, which is now under Nepal’s jurisdiction and has
been officially renamed Shuklaphanta. At that time, there
was one Brahmin girl in the group and she fell in love with
one of the retainers. Due to her higher caste status, it was
agreed that her husband could never enter the kitchen when
she made food. Their descendants are today known as Rana
Tharus. The earliest settlements were Iymilia, Hariya, Bataya
and Bichawa, which were located in the southern part of
the reserve; settlements were later extended to other areas
such as the neighboring district, Kailali. Today, the Rana
population is found in Kanchanpur and Kailali districts in
Nepal and the States of Uttaranchal and Uttar Pradesh in
India. Afterwards, the Dangauras who originally came from
the western district of Dang moved into Rauteli Bichawa and
worked for Rana families. Some people from the neighboring
hill districts occasionally visited Rauteli Bichawa Village for
casual agricultural work. The hill people were afraid to live
in this region because of their fear of malaria.
However, another version of the origins of the Ranas was
told by a Rana from another village in Kanchanpur. After
the downfall of Maha Rana Pratap (a ruler of Rajasthan),
many Ranas were killed in battle. Instead of taking jauhar
(in ancient Hindu times, upon the death of their husbands
in battle, Rajput women were expected to immolate
themselves), Rana queens were sent to safer places in Nepal
with their Rana guards. However, they lost their way in the
forest and settled down, in Kanchanpur, Kailali, Dudhwa
National Park and Nainital district in the Indian State of
Uttaranchal. The queens waited for their husbands to join
them but they did not. So the queens and the Rana guards
agreed to lead a conjugal life. Their descendants are known
as Rana Tharus. None of the Rauteli Bichawas Ranas had
heard this story. The conflicting views about the origins of
Ranas illustrate the issue of self-identity of Ranas and how
they relate to others, which will be discussed later in the
paper.
According to Srivastava’s (1958) and Krauskopff’s (2002)
analysis, because of the close links Ranas have to India
and their living in isolation, a strong Nepali identity did
not develop in the Rana community. Both of them point
out that Ranas do not claim Tharu ethnicity but often cling
to their royal pedigree, which left deep marks on every
aspect of their culture (see examples below). This suggests
that despite the rise of democracy and ethnic politics in
Nepal since the 1990s, the Rana social movement is more
influenced by the tribal rights movements in India. For
example, in 1995, Ranas formed their own organization
called the Rana Reform Society (Rana Sudhar Samaj) and it
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is a movement more like the earlier caste association marked
by “Sanskritization”.8
Rauteli Bichawa Ranas share the same situation. My
ethnographic data shows that administrative control of the
State in the Kanchanpur district was very limited. I was
told that some old Rauteli Bichawa Ranas did not know that
Nepal existed as a country. Interactions with the outside
world were almost absent in geographically isolated villages
like Rauteli Bichawa. Contact between the State and Rauteli
Bichawa has existed for less than a century. According to a
Rana ex-Jimidar 9, the first time government officers visited
the place was c. 1935. This means that after the restoration
of the Naya Muluk to Nepal in 1860, the Rauteli Bichawa
has not been governed directly by the State for 72 years,
only though local functionaries like the jimidars. The power
was thus wielded by local elites who owned large amounts
of land. The ex-leader of Rauteli Bichawa, Mandal Upadhya,
pointed out that the existence of Rana settlements was not
known to the State until the 1950s. Such historical and
geographical circumstances thus contributed to alternative
social movements in the Rana community to those
developing among other Tharu groups.

SOCIAL CHANGES SINCE THE 1950s
In Nepal, many studies have demonstrated that
ethnicity is dynamic during different political periods
(Pfaff-Czarnecka 1997; Sharma 1997) and the change
in landownership is a crucial factor for shaping ethnic
relationships (Caplan 1970; Jones 1967). It is likely that
when more violent social changes occur, a more active
ethnic consciousness develops among social groups. Similar
to other Tharu groups, recent history shows that Rauteli
Bichawa Ranas experienced remarkable socio-economic
changes, including shifts in demography and rising conflicts
over land resources. The government enacted a resettlement
and land tenure policy and the introduction of protected
areas that were responsible for these changes. As a result,
Ranas became a minority group and lost substantial land
to hill migrants and the State. These dramatic changes in
socio-economic status made them search for a new identity.

Government-activated Resettlement programs and
Forest loss
Following the success of the malaria eradication program
in the Tarai region during the 1950s, Kanchanpur became
more hospitable not only to Tharus but for all other people,
particularly the hill population. The biggest resettlement
project was carried out in Kanchanpur in 1971. Thousands
8. In his detailed analysis on cultural changes of Ranas, Srivastava
(1958) observes that the caste climbing based social movement is not
necessarily adopted by all classes of Ranas. At the local level, the identity
strategies are often shaped by different livelihood realities.
9. Jimidars were the local elites who were officially appointed by the
State to collect taxes from other cultivators. They often owned vast amounts
of land and their influence on local politics and economics was significant.

of families from Jhapa, Bhojpur, Chitwan, Dhading and
Nawalparasi were resettled on forest land in Kanchanpur.
Apart from government-sponsored resettled programs, large
scale uncontrolled migration also occurred in Kachanpur
following the eradication of malaria. Many migrants from
neighboring hill districts moved down in order to search for
fertile land, better education and job opportunities.
This migration resulted in Kanchanpur changing from
the least populated district in the Tarai to becoming a major
destination for hill migrants. In 1961, it had a population
of only 17,000. With an average 6.02 percent growth, its
population reached 68,863 in 1972 and 377,899 in 2000.
The increase was largely generated by the influx of hill
migrants over the past thirty years (Pandey & Yonzon 2003).
Nowadays, the dominant population consists of the hill
migrants rather than the indigenous Tharu. The Nepalese
government ever distinguishes between different Tharu
groups in the national population census, so Ranas are only
broadly categorized into the “Tharu” group. According to
the 2001 census data, the caste and ethnic distribution of
the population in Kanchanpur were as follows: Chettri (30
percent); Tharu (20 percent); Brahmin (17 percent); Dalits
(14 percent); Thakuri (5 percent); and others (14 percent).
The dramatic increase in population in Kanchanpur
after the 1950s was accompanied by the significant loss
of forest tracts due to increasing demands on agricultural
land and forest-related resources. Responding to the
shrinkage of forest, the government established the Royal
Shuklaphanta Wildlife Reserve (hereafter referred to as
“the Park”) in 1976 with a total area 155 sq.km. However,
the ongoing development of new settlements adjoining
the Park and illegal settlement in the whole district has
hindered preservation efforts in the Park. Activities such as
logging, grazing and poaching have seriously damaged the
natural environment and wildlife habitats. The reserve was
therefore considered too small for wildlife and encroached
on by humans too often (Bhattarai 2001). An extension of
the Park was launched in 1981 to strengthen conservation of
the flora and fauna in the area (Bhattarai 2001). It proposed
to establish another 155 sq.km for the reserve. This time, a
total of seventeen existing blocks of five villages inside the
proposed extension area were affected and Rauteli Bichawa
was the largest affected village.
Although official data concerning the Rana population
in Rauteli Bichawa was not available, two sources of data I
collected from the field showed that the village experienced
significant changes in its demographic landscape due to the
hill migration and the creation of the Park. According to exleader Vagat Rana, the total population of Rauteli Bichawa at
one time had been estimated to be about 30,000 to 35,000
of which 20,000 were Ranas. An ex-secretary of the Rauteli
Bichawa Village Development Committee Office indicated
that before the displacement, the total population of Rauteli
Bichawa was 9,956 with 1,642 households in 2000. The
largest population group consisted of twice-born Pahaaris—

Chettri (33.81 percent) and Brahmin (9.78 percent)-- and
the Tharu population was second (31.45 percent). The third
group consisted of untouchable castes (7.48 percent). A
secretary who was a local villager, and therefore familiar
with the composition of the local population, pointed out
that the total number of Rana households was 350 (21
percent) and they were distributed unevenly in the nine
wards. After the park-induced displacement in 2001, Rauteli
Bichawa became the smallest administrative village in
Kanchanpur district with only three existing hamlets, while
six wards were included in the new boundary of the park.
A total of 1,061 households from Wards 1 to 6 and a few
from Wards 7 and 8 were therefore relocated, including 204
Rana households. The displacement has resulted in the total
number of Rana households living in Rauteli Bichawa Village
dropping to only 150. The scope of this paper covers both
resettled and non-resettled Rauteli Bichawa Ranas. While
the above data on Rana population seem contradictory, they
reflect the fact that the Rana population in Rauteli Bichawa
has declined dramatically in recent decades.

The Transformation of Landownership
Meanwhile, Kanchanpur also experienced substantial
transformation of landownership. Until the 1930s, the
development of property rights was restricted to the
Tarai region. At that time, property rights were granted
to Tarai cultivators in return for paying taxes to the local
administration. These cultivators were allowed to sell or to
mortgage their raikar10 land under certain conditions. This
was a response to the problem of abundant wasteland in
the Tarai so a more competitive and flexible land policy
was introduced to encourage economic development. At
that time, the State had to rely on the cooperation of local
elites to exercise its power over land resources indirectly.
This situation changed completely after the introduction of
a series of land reforms in the 1950s. Under this new land
policy, all raikar cultivators were upgraded to landowners
who could trade their land freely and landownership would
only be granted through official land registration documents
and an obligation to pay taxes to the State (Regmi 1999).
The policy caused dramatic changes in landownership in
Kanchanpur. Before the hill migration and land reforms,
almost all land in Kanchanpur was controlled by indigenous
Ranas. Afterwards, landownership rapidly transferred from
the Ranas to the hill migrants. There was no exception for
Rauteli Bichawa Ranas. I was told by local informants that
Ranas were dispersed because of hill migration and parkinduced resettlement, and many of them became small
landholders or even landless.
10. Land was the property of the State and this type of land was
known as raikar. All land tenure in Kanchanpur was thus considered part of
the raikar system. Under this state-as-landlord system, the government had
absolute power to grant and confiscate land and could appropriate land for
its own needs (Regmi 1963; 1999).
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IDENTITY TRANSFORMATIONS IN RANA
SOCIETY
The identity of Rauteli Bichawa Ranas is closely related
to territories, common origin and shared cultural practices.
They believe that their ancestors came from India and they
are decendants of Rajputs. They speak the Rana language,
wear traditional dress and practice the same customs.
All of these make them a distinctive ethnic group (Smith
1986). However, Rana ethnicity is not solely bound up with
cultural and historical factors. Its development is in fact a
balanced response to being poor, a minority and to claiming
royal descent. Before I turn to discuss the identity of Rauteli
Bichawa Ranas, it is worth looking at the work of Odegaard
(1997) and Skar (1999). Their studies show that the Rana
identity is dynamic and takes on many different forms.

An Alternative Rana Reform Movement: Hindu and
Tribal
The most extensive study of Rana social reforms was
done by Odegaard (1997), who observes that “contrary
to the pan-ideology which rejects the hierarchical caste
structure, the Ranas’ strategy [is to] optimize social status
first in what is commonly referred to as caste-climbing.”
She points out that the most critical obstacle for Ranas in
Nepal to overcome in their drive to affiliate with the panTharu movement was their “caste” status. Like the Ranas
in India, they claimed they were descendents of Rajputs.
They strongly felt that they were not indigenous to the
Tarai and believed they originally derived from Chittogarh
in India (Odegaard 1997). Their belief hardly fitted into
the new ideology of the pan-Tharu movement. Moreover,
Ranas lived in the remote western Tarai, and this separated
them from the other Tharu groups. They had very few
opportunities to participate in the pan-Tharu movement.
For example, when the first International Tharu Culture
Conference was held in 1995, participants included Tharus
from both India and Nepal except for Ranas from Kalaili and
Kanchanpur (Odegaard 1997). The Rana elites blamed the
problems of distance and non-existence of well-established
Rana organizations as the two major reasons for their nonparticipation. As Odegaard (1997) records, an influential
member of the Rana elite queried the unity of all Tharu
groups in one social movement, commenting that “Since
there are so many Tharu groups differing in several aspects,
a collective reform movement becomes difficult. Each group
has to start with itself.”
In fact, the Rana reform moment in Nepal was more
likely a part of a pan-Rana movement in India (Krauskopff
2002; Odegaard 1997; Srivastava 1958). The Rana social
movement in India had started in the 1930s. The Rana
community was aware of its own social and economic
backwardness so 18 rules were set up to improve their social
status. For example, alcohol and meat (particularly pork)
were prohibited and social prestige was not attached to social
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practices like bride price, intercaste marriage11 and sharing
water pipes with lower castes. Ranas, furthermore, wore the
holy cord as twice-born castes did. Later, the reform focused
on adopting high Hindu castes’ socio-religious practices.
The Rana elites advocated that Ranas should use Brahmins
for various ceremonies and Rana women should behave
like high Hindu caste women. However, the reform did not
achieve much at the local level, as many Ranas still practiced
their old customs. In 1967, the Ranas with other five tribes
in Uttar Pradesh successfully got themselves declared as a
“scheduled tribe,” which meant they had certain privileges
in education and political participation. The better-off Ranas
in India were admired by the Ranas in Nepal.
Motivated by the success of Ranas in India and sharing
their origin myth encouraged Ranas in Nepal to participate
in the pan-Rana movement, rather than the pan-Tharu
movement. According to Odegaard (1997), the Rana social
reform movement in Nepal started in 1991 and an elitebased organization known as Rana Samaaj Sudhaar (Rana
Reform Society) was formed. Instead of struggling for more
political power, it emphasized that Ranas’ first priority was
to modernize. Two large Rana meetings were held in Kalaili
and Kanchanpur in 1993 and 1994 respectively. More than
250 Rana delegates attended these meetings and most of
them were educated elites who owned much land. They
wanted to be more ‘developed’ and share equal social status
with the other castes of Nepal. The reform activists strongly
felt that Ranas should abandon their old concerns of simply
living as they put it, “to eat and sleep”. They advocated
the abolition of customs like Magani (child marriage), and
advocated learning Nepali and providing a good education
for children. These approaches were similar to that of the
pan-Rana movement in India.
Another anthropologist, Harald Skar, shows in his study
on Rana identity (1999) that most Ranas in Nepal think
themselves as being Hindus. He points out that Ranas
never eat beef or buffalo because such food is perceived
as low-status, impure and only to be consumed by the
lower caste groups. Although according to tradition Ranas
bury their dead along riverbanks, they now also perform
a ritual of sending the spirit down the river, and go to the
holy shrine of Haridwar to perform rituals as Hindus, in
honor of their dead. After long contact with Ranas, Skar
concludes that the identities of Ranas are both situational
and topical because Ranas categorize themselves as Hindu
and tribal. My observation of everyday ethnic relations of
Rauteli Bichawa Ranas echoes these scholars’ analyses.
Furthermore, my data shows that ethnicity is a product of
specific political circumstances, but its nature varies. It is a
strategy that human agents can utilize and modify on the
basis of their histories and livelihood realities. Growing
11. Inter-caste marriage remains contentious in Nepal as marriages
in the Hindu society are caste driven. Inter-caste marriages are considered
to be a sin and are not approved by the elders. As a result, the couple will
suffer the loss of social prestige.

from their experience of similar social changes (e.g.
the transformation of landownership, the introduction
of dominant hill cultures and conservation policies),
Rana social movements represent an alternative to the
mainstream pan-Tharu movement.

Multiple Identities as a Social Climbing
Strategy
My ethnographic data has shown that caste ideology
had significantly influenced the self-identity of Ranas
and their relationships with other Tharu groups. A
detailed look at the myth of Rana origin allows us
to examine more closely how Ranas thought about
and valued themselves. Fisher (2001) comments that
different versions of their origin myth allow people
to adapt to different socio-political environments. An
absence of written histories about Kanchanpur Ranas
was one of the major difficulties of my fieldwork; Ranas
created histories of origin that favored their interests.
My discussion of their myth of origin therefore does
not focus on historical reliability but on understanding
what Ranas claim themselves to be and their motivation
for this claim.
In one version of their myth, a former Rana
village leader, Vagat Rana, claims that Ranas were not
Tharus.12 He explained that Ranas had become Tharus Figure 1. The R ana groom still holds a knife (in his right hand) to symbolize the
today because people did not know much about their
warrior status of ancient times. (P hoto: L ai M ing L am).
own history:
Our ancestors moved from India to here to
escape the Muslim enemies. At that time,
they were scared of being killed. Later, they
realized that their features were similar to the
Tarai people - Tharus. With a consideration of
defence, they started to introduce themselves
as ‘Tharus’. As time went by, people often call
us ‘Tharus’. Actually, we are very different
from ‘Tharus’; we are Rana.

He also argued that Ranas were in fact the same caste
as the Chettri (see Figure 1). His evidence was that Rana
males used to wear the sacred thread, which was the most
important symbol of people from twice-born castes. He
blamed the disappearance of this particular tradition on
security concerns. In the past, wearing the sacred thread
made their ancestors vulnerable to attacks by Muslims, for
their status could easily be seen. Therefore, they chose to
take off their threads, and since then Rana males do not
wear the sacred thread any more.12
Similar findings are noted by Odegaard (1997). She
12. As mentioned in earlier sections, practicing twice-born caste
culture was one of the major strategies used by the pan-Rana movement
in India. Although there was no evidence that Ranas from RSWR were
influenced by the pan-Rana movement, they adopted similar approaches to
the Ranas in India.

observes that Ranas from Kalaili district insisted on the
belief that Ranas were descendants of Rajputs. They
criticized the version of the myth that claimed that Ranas
were descended from the queen and her servant, claiming
this was incorrect and an insult to Ranas.13 According to one
of the most influential Ranas in Kalaili, Hari Lal Rana, Ranas
were descended from a Rajput and a Brahmin. This version
was the same as the one I heard from Rauteli Bichawa Ranas.
He further claimed that Ranas were descendants of the
glorious and famous Hindu hero Maharana Pratap Singh.14
He remarked:
We Ranas are not indigenous . . . We came from
India, from Rajasthan. . . . The Rana Thakurs
are thus descendents of Rajputs and Brahmins.
We always wear the white turnan (phagya)
and we always had a knife (talwar) in our belt
(like Rajputs/ warriors) . . . We also take our
purification baths together with people from
Rajasthan and not with other Tharus and
Nepalese people (cited in Odegaard 1997).
13. For a detailed account of different versions of the myth of Rana
origins, see Odegaard (1997).
14. Maharana Pratap Singh remains a great hero in the eyes of most
Indians because he never compromised his honor and he fought the
Moghul invaders bravely.
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Hari Lal Rana’s statement clearly demonstrated
that Ranas utilize caste ideology and the origin myth to
identify themselves as high caste people and disassociate
themselves from other lower caste groups, particularly the
Tharus. This happened in the relationship between Ranas
and Dangauras. Most Rauteli Bichawa Ranas were reluctant
to accept the name “Tharu” because Tharu meant lower
caste groups in the eyes of most Ranas. Many old Ranas
still felt that Dangauras were backward people and they did
not share the same hygienic concerns as the Ranas did.15
Even though the Dangauras had experienced significant
social and economic development16 and this was widely
recognized by Ranas, deeply-rooted prejudices affected the
ethnic relations between Ranas and Dangauras. A comment
made by a young and educated Rana clearly illustrates
the sharp caste and cultural divisions between these two
groups:
We are different. We don’t practise
intermarriage.17 I think Rana is better than
Dangauras. But the government only calls us
“Tharus.” Dangauras are from the eastern part
of Nepal [actually, Dangauras are from western
part of Nepal. East is a relative term] and close
to the government so they are smarter than us.
I don’t think there is any domination between
us, however, I never can agree we are the same
caste. We write our name Rana and they write
Dangauras or Chaudhary. Although I know
we are both categorised as the second lower
caste under the caste system, we have our own
cultures. Dangauras are always socially lower
than Ranas.

It was apparent that the Rana acceptance of caste ideology
and social exclusion of “lower caste” Dangauras fit into the
typical caste-climbing approach called Sanskritization.
However, we cannot reject the existence of egalitarian
concepts in the formation of Rana identity. It was ironic
that twice-born Pahaaris and Ranas had different caste
positions under the Muluki Ain (national legal code). While
the Pahaaris (Brahmins and Chhetris) were ranked high
and granted great social prestige, Ranas were categorized
as the second lowest caste (masinya matwali or enslavable
alcohol-drinkers). Although this externally imposed social
hierarchy was probably not accepted by Ranas, it influenced
their ethnic relations with Pahaaris. Most RSWR Ranas in
15. I observed that the Ranas were very concerned about cleanliness,
so their houses always looked very tidy compared to those of other ethnic
groups.
16. The Dangauras were very adaptable and many of them were
economically and educationally more advanced than Ranas.
17. In analyzing the relationships between hierarchy and endogamy,
Quigley (1993: 112) points out that strict control over affiliation by
marriage is one way for a cultural group to prevent another group entering
its ranks.
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fact felt that they shared the same social status as Pahaaris.
They interpreted the castes in a different way. They thought
different castes meant different jaats and did not imply any
social ranking. They did not feel themselves inferior to the
Pahaaris. One Rana shared his view of caste with me:
Caste, I know, I know there are five different
caste groups (jaats) under the caste system.
I don’t think there are ranking relations
between different caste groups. These groups
are different only because they have different
cultural practices and lineage.

One wealthier Rana expressed his feeling of being a
Rana in this way:
My parents were born in this caste. I grew up
in this culture. I don’t have any feeling that
I want to be of other castes. I love my own
culture. I feel that there are no differences
between Brahmins, Chettris and Ranas. The
only problem is that different caste people will
try to dominate others. Just like some people
will easily say that you are Ranas or Brahmins
to justify your social position. I don’t like this
kind of domination.

Similar feelings were shared by another poorer Rana:
I never feel sad to be a Rana. Maybe Brahmins
will think they are big people. Pahaaris will
think they are big people. I think I am (Rana)
also big people. I feel there is no difference
between Ranas and other caste people.
Probably, the only difference is that we are
poor because we can’t provide education to
our children.

Ranas do not passively accept caste ideology and it does
not determine their self-identity. The formation of Rana
identity is a process of negotiation between local histories,
local power structures and the caste system. This view is
shared by Russell (1997: 326-327), who argues that “rather
than seeing people as passive recipients of the forces of
modernization, Hinduization, or nation-state, prefers to see
them as potentially active manipulators, negotiators and
transformers of the cultural forms.” In the case of Rauteli
Bichawa Ranas, they selectively used and modified the caste
system and articulated it into their histories and finally a
local caste category was established whereby Ranas had a
higher social ranking than Dangauras and the same caste
position as Pahaari Chhetris.
It is important for us to understand what caste means to
the people themselves. As Hocart puts it:

Over the last few decades, due to the influence of hill
cultures, Rauteli Bichawa Ranas have made significant
changes to their own cultural practices to fit the high caste
model. These included changes in gender relations and
many customs. For example, the outsiders’ image of Rana
males’ inferior social status in the family and in society
made them embarrassed, particularly when they interacted

with Pahaaris. Rana males therefore wanted to “reportray”
their domination over women to enhance their self-esteem.
Most Rana women pointed out that they suffered more at
the hands of male authority than in the past. The level of
control significantly increased particularly after marriage
and motherhood. They often needed permission from their
husbands if they planned to go somewhere (see detailed
discussion on gender relations in Rana society in Lam
2009). Hill cultures also significant influenced the daily
customs of Ranas. For example, some Rana elites promoted
the prohibition of pork consumption and followed the
high Hindu castes by only eating goat meat. Traditionally,
Deepawali was not only a Hindu festival but also a special
time for Ranas’ ritual ceremonies to honour their ancestors.
Unlike the Pahaari customs, Ranas’ Deepawali was not a
five-day-long festival. They would only celebrate one special
day which was the last day of Deepawali (Bhaaitikka). On
the night before Bhaaitikka, they would kill many chickens
to worship their gods before sunrise. For the poor Ranas,
they would make flour-chicken for worship. After that,
sisters would give tikka (red powder on the forehead means
blessing) and flower necklaces to their brothers. Nowadays,
most relatively wealthier Ranas emulate Pahaari cultures by
worshipping dogs and cows.
Furthermore, more Ranas spoke Nepali and gave up their
traditional dress. One old Rana man blamed the loss of Rana
tradition on the moving-in of Pahaaris: “when we wore our
traditional clothes, Pahaaris would find it easy to say ‘how
nice’ (kati raamro). We men felt very uncomfortable and
finally gave up wearing our clothes any more” (see Figure
2). On the other hand, Rana women turned to wearing more
saris because they were cheaper and more comfortable to
work in as they attended to their duties in the fields. It was
difficult to determine if the transformation of Rana culture
was due to Sanskritization19 because the new Rana cultural
practices might not have the same meaning attached to them
as Pahaari cultures do. On the contrary, often they were a
form of articulation of both Ranas and Pahaaris cultures.
A similar observation is made by Buggeland (1994) in her
study of Kali worship among the Santals of Nepal. She finds
that although the ways in which Santals worshipped Kali are
similar as Pahaaris, Santals interpret the ritual differently as
part of their own cosmological ideology. Russell (1997: 370)
also comments that scholars’ recognition of ‘culture itself
may be subject to change’ is important for understanding the
formation of ethnicity. As Srivastava (1958) points out, the
cultural changes of Ranas are through adoption, assimilation
and acculturation.

18. Regarding the concept of “management identity” see Allen
(1997) and Russell (1997). For example, Allen (1997) points out that the
Thulung community has its own interpretation for the difference between
untouchable castes, higher Hindu castes and themselves. Russell also
notes (1997:331) that the identity labels of the Yakkha group in Nepal are
changing in terms of home, village, the nation-state, the world beyond, and
the spirit world.

19. Allen (1997: 318) argues that cultural assimilation or process of
Sanskritization may not necessarily be decided by non-Hindu castes and
Hindu castes because these cultural practices are deeply embedded in their
daily interactions.

We must search for that principle not in our
minds, but in the minds of those people who
practice the caste system, who have daily
experience of it, and are thus most likely to
have a feeling for what is most essential in it
(cited in Dumont & Pocock 1958: 46).

Odegaard also comments that:
There exists no single caste system, but local
and regional variations of communities which
arrange themselves hierarchically in relation
to one another within a particular territory
(1997).

Ranas and Pahaaris positioned themselves as higher
caste groups and Dangauras as inferior to them. The multiple
identities of Ranas became their management strategy18
for dealing with everyday ethnic relationships. However,
similar to the situation concerning the Dangauras, no matter
how Ranas reclaimed their high caste status, they were not
treated as such by the twice-born Pahaaris. A comment
made by one Iymilia Pahaari woman indicates that different
caste status remained a deep-rooted demarcation for Ranas
and Pahaaris. Another version regarding the origin of Ranas
was provided by her, and this story was generally believed
by most old Pahaaris settlers:
Ranas are Tharus. This is the fact. Long time
ago, those Tharus worked in the palace. Later,
the Rana king was killed and his daughter
fled with a group of Tharu. Finally, she got
married to one of the Tharus. After that,
their descendants become ‘Rana Tharus’.
Fundamentally, they are no different to
Tharus. Like my father, he even perceives
Ranas as an ‘untouchable caste’ and refuses to
accept their water.

Cultural Adaptation and Preservation and Identity
Consciousness
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his class, less than ten percent of students were Ranas. He
was shy about learning and speaking Nepali and finally he
decided to quit his studies. He said that because he spoke
the Rana language, he considered himself to be a Rana
rather than a Nepalese:
I feel good when people call me Rana. I really
feel myself a Rana. I never think I am a Nepali
and I have no intention of being a Nepali also.
Probably, the basic criterion for being a Nepali
is to learn Nepali. I can’t write and speak
Nepali well. I always feel uncomfortable when
speaking Nepali. I prefer to speak the Rana
language if the choice is available.

Figure 2. Few young R ana males wear traditional clothing (long white
dress with red decorations) to perform the Holi dance. (P hoto: L ai M ing
L am).

Rauteli Bichawa Ranas incorporated aspects of many
new cultures into their own in order to make themselves
fit into the wider society. However, when such cultural
adaptation occurred in Rana society, a sense of cultural
preservation emerged along with it. This was a challenge
in retaining ethnicity. In the identity management process,
the more Ranas adopted the new cultures, the more they
were aware of their own culture. This was evident with
the Rauteli Bichawa Ranas. Speaking the Rana language,
wearing the traditional Gangriya dress and celebrating
the Holi festival all became symbolic of being Rana. This
cultural revival might not help Ranas resist the continuous
influence of hill cultures which have more vigorous and
powerful identities. However, when opportunities do
become available to Ranas, their traditional cultures would
be a powerful weapon with which to reclaim the value of
the group within a complex and hierarchical society. A few
examples below help to illustrate this argument.
Firstly, language was a key element in maintaining the
Rana identity. In my observation, many older generation
Rauteli Bichawa Ranas hesitated in claiming to be Nepalese
because of different languages. One old Rana said to me
that “I feel good to be a Rana. I don’t know why I have
this feeling. You know, we have one national language —
Nepali — but I can’t speak it.” The story of a young Rana
demonstrated how linguistic barriers prevented the Ranas
from being assimilated into the cultural melting pot to some
extent.20 Krishanna Rana was thirteen years old and had
completed grade four. He found it very difficult to continue
his studies because he could not speak Nepali very well. In
20. On the other hand, language is one of the main reasons for
increasing social exclusion because it often prevents powerless social groups
from integrating into mainstream society (Gaige 1975).
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Secondly, the Rana identity was also reflected in the Holi
celebration. Although most Rauteli Bichawa Ranas were
not enthusiastic about celebrating Holi due to economic
hardship, the symbolic meaning of Holi to most Ranas
should not be neglected. Celebrating Holi was not simply
a matter of praying to the Hindu gods; it represented the
solidarity of Rana society and ethnic identity. Today, its
continuation symbolizes the survival of Rana cultures. I
recalled an instance during the March 2005 Holi festival
in a new resettlement area. A few dancing groups formed
as usual but the festival atmosphere was strained among
the displaced Rauteli Bichawa Ranas. Only a few Rana
families planned to invite dancing groups and organized
Holi parties. My host family in the resettlement area was
one of the wealthiest Rana families but they did not plan
to do so. Three nights of celebrations passed and by noon
on the fourth day, I still did not hear any news whether
the celebration could continue. The Ranas felt sad that
this year’s Holi celebration activities lasted only three
days. Suddenly, a celebration was held by my host family
and the decision was made by the elder son who had just
come back from another village. That night, the family
used almost 50 kilos of rice and 30 kilos of potatoes. Later,
the son explained that the Holi celebration was one of the
most important Rana customs and they used to have a onemonth long celebration, so he felt very upset when he heard
the celebration had to stop on the third day. He pointed
out that increased poverty and separated population had
weakened the cultural identity of Ranas:
Of course, nowadays we can’t celebrate festivals
together because all of us are getting poorer
than before. When it was inside the park, we
were always together. Today, we are resettled
in different areas and we are far from each
other. People also get less food than before so
everyone just looks for their own family how
to survive and are not interested in celebrating
festivals together. If we were not moved out,
we would have a big Holi celebration like those

Ranas in the old settlements. Also, now the new
generation is really not interested in celebration,
they can’t sing Rana Holi songs. In my place,
there are only a few Rana families, so I need to
bring back my children to here to see how Rana
celebrate Holi. I feel if Ranas only look after
themselves, many changes will happen in the
future. Like my son, he never knows what Rana
or Holi are. Ten years ago, I celebrated Holi and
it was really very nice, may be after 10 years, all
these traditions will disappear.

He also mentioned that Ranas were proud of their culture
and would like to continue religious performances such as
Holi dancing if opportunities arose. On hearing this, I told
him that even though film makers might be interested in
shooting a film regarding the Holi celebration, it would be
too late because Rana culture was disappearing rapidly. He
disagreed with me by saying, “If we were informed earlier
about the film maker’s visit, we would prepare and perform
our cultures to him, particularly our women would wear the
local Gangriya dress again.” One educated Rana knew I had
planned to write a book about Rana society; he repeatedly
requested me to include the Rana Holi celebration.
The third example concerned Rana dress. As I have
mentioned previously, the traditional Rana dress was
completely replaced by the mainstream Nepalese dress for
social and economic reasons. However, this transformed
culture did not necessarily mean the abandonment of the old
culture. Both new and old cultures existed simultaneously
but served different functions. Wearing traditional dress had
become a cultural performance (see Figure 3 and 4 below).
During my fieldwork, I was asked many times to photograph
Rana women. They would emphasize that they were wearing
the traditional Gangriya. Obviously, they were aware that to
others their clothes were unique and were confident that this
tradition would attract outsiders like me. Since most Rana
women did not know how to sew their own Gangriya like
older generations did, they had to borrow Gangriya from
friends. They all felt that Gangriya was beautiful. After taking
photos, one Rana woman said to me that the photo was a
good memento of her life. Realizing the value of gangriya, a
Rana woman even sold this “tradition” to me. She made a new
gangriya and sold it to me for Rs 3,000. Odegaard expresses
a similar finding (1997). She was requested to take photos
many times by Dangauras, and Ranas during her fieldwork.
Odegaard shared her feelings in this way:
When Tharus in Geti saw that “important
people” and foreigners were interested in Tharu
culture, their apprehension of “their culture”
also changed. The fact that they were urged to
“protect’ their culture” has engendered a new
self-understanding and a new relation to their
cultural identity (1997).

Figure 3. No matter how difficult it is to wear Gangriya and to put silver
rings on their legs, R anas were still enthusiastic about showing their
custom to me.

(P hoto: L ai Ming L am).

Conclusion
This paper has discussed the interdependent and
dynamic relationships of ethnicity, history, cultural
practices and changes in people’s livelihoods. The above
discussion has not argued that Ranas have a strong
sense of cultural preservation. Instead, it demonstrated
that after extensive contacts with others, the formation
and transformation of Rana ethnic identity and cultural
practices were so complicated that one single approach
could not explain it. The ethnographic data supported
the contention that the Rana reform movement was
neither one of Sanskritization or Indigenousness. Their
identities are many-stranded, situational and topical
(Skar 1999: 196-198). They resisted the “Tharu” label
and strongly claimed to have the same caste status as the
high Hindu caste Pahaaris. Regarding cultural changes,
Rana did not accept all hill cultures but they selected and
modified aspects of them into their own, for example the
Dipawaali festival. Meanwhile, vanishing aspects of their
culture—particularly Holi and traditional dress—might
be caused by many factors such as conservation-induced
displacement and poverty. Therefore they had to adjust
the way they responded to these economic realties. When
cultural reforms became necessary in Rana society, Ranas’
self-consciousness of their own culture’s values increased
simultaneously. Indeed, these practices became a cultural
performance and a new meaning emerged.
My finding echoes that of Oakdale (2004) and Turner
(1991). Their studies have clearly shown that people from
traditional societies, like those of Indians in Brazil, are
having their cultures modified or recreated after contact
with outside world. In the process of cultural change, instead
of being completely assimilated, they actively negotiate and
manage their identity and cultural practice. For example,
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Turner observes that in the 1960s, almost all
Kayapo Indians wore full Western clothing.
However, since the 1990s, they have chosen
“half-and half” with long pants or shorts and
no shirt or jacket. Their faces and upper bodies
are painted and they wear traditional shell
necklaces and bead earrings. The explanation
for this change is the global indigenous
movement; Kayapo Indians increasingly value
the social, economic and political traditions of
their own cultures. It is thus predictable that the
Rana culture will be further transformed in this
way. The articulation of growing ethnic identity
and the new national and global political
environments are an opportunity for Ranas to
remodel themselves and avoid dissolving into
the “national melting pot.”21 However, it is too
early to comment on the extent to which this
has happened because cultural survival is often
closely associated with the Ranas’ livelihoods.
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